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Abstract	  What	  are	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis	  on	  electoral	  turnout?	  Existing	  studies	  on	   participation	   focus	   almost	   exclusively	   on	   the	   losers	   of	   the	   crisis	   when	   ad-­‐dressing	   this	   question,	   i.e.	   voters	  with	   low	   socio-­‐economic	   resources.	   Thereby,	  they	  overlook	  that	  in	  countries	  that	  have	  been	  hit	  hard	  by	  the	  crisis,	  turnout	  has	  declined	   substantially	   among	   the	   highly	   skilled	   citizens.	   Neither	   resource-­‐	   nor	  conflict-­‐theory	  of	  political	  participation	  can	  account	  for	  this.	  	  	  	  	  In	  this	  paper,	  we	  propose	  a	  new	  explanation:	  anticipation	  of	  government	  ineffi-­‐cacy.	   Where	   economic	   austerity	   constrains	   governments,	   highly	   educated	   citi-­‐zens	  with	  the	  necessary	  political	  knowledge	  and	  sophistication	  anticipate	  the	  in-­‐efficacy	  of	  the	  future	  government	  and	  they	  factor	  this	  knowledge	  in	  when	  decid-­‐ing	  about	  electoral	  participation.	  Therefore,	   the	  positive	  effects	  of	  education	  on	  turnout	  decline	  with	  increasing	  international	  and	  domestic	  austerity	  constraints.	  We	  provide	   cross-­‐sectional	   and	   longitudinal	   evidence	   for	   this	   argument	  on	   the	  basis	  of	  ESS	  data	  between	  2006	  and	  2012,	  as	  well	  as	  different	  measures	  of	  gov-­‐ernment	  constraint	  in	  28	  European	  countries.	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1.	  Introduction	  What	   are	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   on	   electoral	   turnout?	  While	   an	   in-­‐creasing	  literature	  studies	  the	  effects	  of	  the	  great	  recession	  on	  government	  reac-­‐tions	  (Pontusson	  and	  Raess	  2012,	  Armingeon	  2012)	  or	  on	  the	  impact	  of	  econom-­‐ic	  voting	  on	  election	  results	  (Fraile	  and	  Lewis-­‐Beck	  2013),	  we	  know	  little	  about	  the	  crucial	  steps	  preceding	  government	  formation,	  let	  alone	  government	  policies,	  i.e.	  the	  question	  whether	  and	  why	  people	  in	  the	  ongoing	  economic	  crisis	  partici-­‐pate	   at	   all	   in	   the	   election	  of	   a	   new	  government.	   Given	   the	   concerns	   that	  many	  scholars	  have	  recently	  raised	  about	  the	  impact	  of	  increasing	  inequality	  and	  aus-­‐terity	   on	   democratic	   legitimacy	   and	   responsiveness	   (Anderson	   and	  Beramendi	  2012;	  Streeck	  and	  Mertens	  2013;	  Schäfer	  2013;	  Mair	  2013;	  Offe	  2013),	  this	  ques-­‐tion	  seems	  of	  utmost	  importance	  and	  topicality.	  	  The	   literature	   suggests	   an	   effect	   of	   economic	   hardship	   on	   aggregate	   electoral	  turnout	   (Martins	   and	  Veiga	  2012),	   but	   remains	   ambivalent	  with	   respect	   to	   the	  direction	  of	   the	  effect.	  On	   the	  one	  hand,	   it	   could	  be	   that	  citizens	  more	  strongly	  feel	  the	  need	  and	  desire	  to	  express	  their	  grievances	  at	  the	  polls	  –	  the	  “mobiliza-­‐
tion-­‐effect”	  of	  a	  strained	  economic	  context	  (Schlozman	  and	  Verba	  1979).	  On	  the	  other	   hand,	   however,	   citizens	  may	   turn	   away	   from	  politics	   out	   of	   a	   lack	   of	   re-­‐sources	   or	   shifting	   priorities	   –	   the	   “withdrawal	   effect”	   of	   economic	   hardship	  (Rosenstone	  1982).	  	  The	  development	  of	  aggregate	  turnout	  levels	  so	  far	  is	  indeed	  inconclusive.	  Some	  hard	  hit	  countries,	  e.g.	  Ireland,	  show	  an	  increase	  in	  aggregate	  turnout,	  while	  we	  observe	  a	  sharp	  drop	  in	  others,	  e.g.	  Spain	  or	  Greece.1	  	  The	  ambivalence	  of	  these	  results	  point	  to	  a	  blind	  spot	  of	  both	  mobilization-­‐	  and	  the	  withdrawal-­‐theories.	  They	  neglect	  that	  economic	  downturns	  do	  not	  affect	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  society	  in	  the	  same	  way.	  Moreover,	  even	  if	  they	  did,	  the	  reaction	  of	  different	  social	  groups	  to	  economic	  hardship	  may	  still	  vary	  according	  to	  their	  so-­‐cial,	   economic	  or	   cognitive	   resources.	  Thereby,	   countervailing	  effects	  may	  hap-­‐pen	  simultaneously	  and	  overcompensate	  each	  other	  in	  varying	  ways,	  suggesting	  the	   conclusion	   that	   there	   is	   no	   link	   at	   all	   between	   economic	   performance	   and	  turnout.	  Yet,	  there	  is	  a	  very	  high	  chance	  that	  such	  a	  conclusion	  would	  be	  simply	  wrong.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Sources:	  Döring	  and	  Manow	  (2012),	  Inter-­‐Parliamentary	  Union	  and	  the	  Political	  Data	  Yearbook.	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  This	  is	  why	  we	  argue	  in	  this	  paper	  that	  we	  need	  to	  distinguish	  theoretical	  mech-­‐anisms	  linking	  the	  crisis	  to	  participation	  for	  different	  social	  groups.	  More	  specifi-­‐cally,	   we	   focus	   on	   the	   changing	   behavior	   of	   citizens	   with	   high	   levels	   of	   socio-­‐economic	   and	   cognitive	   resources.	   These	   citizens	   used	   to	   be	   the	   champions	   of	  participation	   in	   the	  democratic	  process.	  We	  show	  that	  electoral	   turnout	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  has	  dropped	  considerably	  in	  most	  countries	  that	  have	  been	  hardly	  hit	  by	  the	  crisis.	  Since	  existing	  resource-­‐	  and	  incentive-­‐based	  theories	  fo-­‐cus	  mostly	  on	  the	  behavior	  of	  citizens	  with	  low	  socio-­‐economic	  resources	  (Verba,	  Schlozman	  and	  Brady	  1995,	  Blais	  2006),	  they	  are	  ill	  equipped	  to	  account	  for	  this	  development,	  as	  they	  would	  expect	  either	  stable	  or	  even	  increasing	  levels	  of	  par-­‐ticipation	  among	  the	  better-­‐off.	  	  	  Therefore,	  we	  propose	  and	  test	  a	  new	  argument	  to	  account	  for	  the	  “hidden	  side”	  of	  declining	   turnout:	  where	  economic	  austerity	   constrains	  governments,	  highly	  educated	  citizens	  with	  the	  necessary	  political	  knowledge	  and	  sophistication	  an-­‐ticipate	   the	   inefficacy	  of	   the	   future	  government	  and	  may	  decide	   to	  abstain,	  be-­‐cause	  they	  do	  not	  believe	  that	  election	  results	  will	  matter.	  Consequently,	  the	  pos-­‐itive	  effects	  of	  education	  on	  turnout	  should	  decline	  with	  increasing	  international	  and	   domestic	   austerity	   constraints.	   This	   is	   indeed	  what	  we	   find	   in	   this	   paper,	  based	  on	  multilevel	  analyses	  of	  the	  determinants	  of	  individual	  turnout:	  when	  cri-­‐sis	  constraints	  were	  particularly	  strong,	  (in	  2008	  and	  2010)	  participation	  levels	  among	   the	   highly	   educated	   dropped,	   as	   compared	   to	   the	   pre-­‐crisis	   period	  (2006).	   Since	   these	   levels	   recovered	   after	   the	   constraints	   were	   somewhat	   re-­‐lieved	  (in	  2012),	  we	  interpret	  our	  findings	  as	  evidence	  for	  a	  crisis-­‐induced,	  cycli-­‐cal	  effect,	  rather	  than	  a	  more	  general	  long-­‐term	  disaffection	  from	  politics	  among	  the	  highly	  educated.	  	  	  Our	  paper	  is	  structured	  as	  follows.	  We	  start	  with	  our	  puzzle,	  the	  drop	  in	  partici-­‐pation	  among	  the	  highly	  education,	  which	  existing	  theories	  are	  unable	  to	  account	  for.	  We	  then	  develop	  our	  own	  theoretical	  argument	  with	  reference	  to	  theories	  of	  economic	  voting,	  before	  testing	  it	  empirically	  by	  means	  of	  a	  hierarchical	  regres-­‐sion	  model.	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2.	  The	  puzzle:	  electoral	  participation	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  in	  times	  of	  
crisis	  Figure	  1	  shows	  that	  turnout	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  has	  dropped	  substantial-­‐ly	   in	  most	   countries	   that	  have	  been	   severely	  hit	   by	   the	   crisis.	  We	   clearly	   see	   a	  negative	  correlation	  between	  the	  government	  deficit	  in	  2010/2011	  (as	  an	  indica-­‐tor	  of	  the	  crisis)	  and	  the	  change	  in	  turnout	  between	  2006	  and	  2010.	  In	  the	  sam-­‐ple	   of	   countries	   available	   (Greece	   and	   Italy,	   notably,	   could	  not	   be	   included	  be-­‐cause	  they	  are	  not	  in	  the	  ESS	  for	  these	  years),	  Ireland	  had	  the	  strongest	  drop	  in	  public	  finances,	  with	  a	  deficit	  of	  almost	  14	  percent.	  Participation	  among	  the	  high	  skilled	  dropped	  by	  almost	  5	  percent.	  Similar	  reductions	  in	  turnout	  could	  be	  ob-­‐served	  in	  Portugal,	  France	  and	  Belgium.	  In	  Austria,	  Cyprus,	  Slovenia	  and	  Hunga-­‐ry,	  which	  were	  strongly	  affected	  by	   the	  crisis,	   as	  well,	   electoral	   turnout	  among	  the	  high	   skilled	  dropped	  even	  more	  massively,	   by	  5-­‐10	  percent.	   In	  other	   crisis	  countries,	  such	  as	  the	  UK,	  Spain	  or	  Poland,	  turnout	  remained	  relatively	  stable	  or	  increased	  very	   slightly.	  However,	   the	  overall	   picture	   is	   clearly	  one	  of	  declining	  turnout	  among	  the	  more	  privileged	  strata	  of	  citizens.	  	  	  This	  drop	  in	  participation	  among	  those	  citizens	  that	  actually	  do	  have	  the	  neces-­‐sary	  social,	  economic	  and	  cognitive	  resources	  to	  participate	  in	  elections	  leaves	  us	  with	  a	  puzzle	  that	  none	  of	  the	  existing	  theories	  can	  account	  for.	  Rather,	  existing	  theories	  would	   predict	   stable	   or	   even	   increasing	   levels	   of	   participation	   among	  the	  highly	  educated.	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Figure	  1:	  Government	  deficit	  and	  change	  in	  participation	  rates	  among	  high	  skilled	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tion	  of	  resources	  in	  the	  society	  should	  foster	  consensus	  and	  quiescence	  in	  socie-­‐ty,	  resulting	  in	  lower	  levels	  of	  political	  engagement	  (Brady	  2004).	  These	  theories	  have	  the	  merit	  to	  distinguish	  between	  different	  incentive	  structures	  for	  the	  rich	  and	  the	  poor,	  but	  they	  still	  arrive	  at	  the	  same	  conclusion:	  heightened	  economic	  strain	  raises	  the	  stakes	  of	  both	  groups	  in	  politics	  and	  should	  stimulate	  participa-­‐tion	  among	  both	  of	  them,	  a	  prediction	  that	  is	  clearly	  not	  in	  line	  with	  figure	  1	  	  There	  are	  indeed	  also	  incentive-­‐based	  approaches	  that	  explain	  withdrawal	  from	  participation	  as	  a	  reaction	  to	  economic	  hardship,	  but	  these	  arguments	  focus	  only	  on	   individual-­‐level	  hardship	  and	  imply	  that	  participation	  should	  remain	   largely	  unaffected	   among	   the	   better	   off.	   Rosenstone’s	   (1982)	   argument	   on	   “economic	  adversity	  and	  voter	  turnout”,	  e.g.,	  goes	  in	  exactly	  this	  direction.	  He	  argues	  that	  in	  times	  of	  economic	  strain,	  the	  priorities	  of	  persons	  who	  suffer	  economic	  adversity	  shift	  towards	  more	  immediate	  concerns,	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  more	  abstract	  or	  “re-­‐mote”	  concerns	  such	  as	  politics.	  The	  result	   is	  a	  demobilizing	  effect	  of	  economic	  downturns,	   by	   depressing	   participation	   among	   the	   economically	   vulnerable	  parts	  of	  society.	  Similarly,	  the	  “relative	  power	  theory”	  (Goodin	  and	  Dryzek	  1980)	  postulates	  that	  increasing	  inequality	  concentrates	  power	  among	  the	  rich,	  which	  is	  why	  they	  more	  consistently	  prevail	  in	  political	  conflict,	  teaching	  the	  poorer	  cit-­‐izens	  that	  their	  goals	  cannot	  be	  effectively	  pursued	  through	  the	  political	  process.	  Again,	   these	   incentive-­‐models	  of	  withdrawal	  do	  not	  help	  us	   in	  making	  sense	  of	  declining	  turnout	  among	  the	  highly	  educated.	  	  Finally,	   the	   most	   important	   line	   of	   theory	   and	   research	   on	   factors	   depressing	  participation	  is,	  of	  course,	  “resource-­‐theory”,	  which	  holds	  that	  relatively	  poorer	  individuals	   tend	   to	   abstain	   from	  political	   participation,	   because	   they	   lack	   time,	  money,	   social	   and	   cognitive	   skills	   to	   engage	   in	   politics	   (Verba,	   Schlozman	   and	  Brady	  1995,	  Gallego	  2010).	  In	  other	  words,	  they	  abstain	  because	  they	  don’t	  have	  the	   necessary	   resources	   to	   participate,	   not	   because	   they	   rationally	   decide	   to	  withdraw	  (which	  is	  the	  implication	  in	  the	  incentive-­‐based	  models).	  Citizens	  with	  higher	  levels	  of	  resources,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  have	  the	  necessary	  resources,	  skills	  and	  psychological	  dispositions	  (interest	  and	  knowledge)	  to	  participate	  in	  politics	  anyway.	  Therefore,	  increasing	  inequality	  should	  depress	  participation	  among	  the	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disadvantaged,	  while	  the	  participation	  of	  the	  upper	  classes	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  sta-­‐ble	   and	   strong.	   The	   argument	   that	   increased	   hardship	   depresses,	   rather	   than	  strengthens,	  participation	  among	  the	  economically	  vulnerable	  is	  also	  shared	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  studies	  on	  inequality	  and	  participation	  (Anderson	  and	  Beramendi	  2011,	  Beramendi	  and	  Rueda	  2011,	  Pontusson	  and	  Rueda	  2010,	  Schäfer	  2013).	  	  As	  we	  could	  see	  from	  this	  short	  review	  of	  the	  literature,	  existing	  theories	  tend	  to	  explain	  variations	  in	  turnout	  mostly	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  (non-­‐)participation	  of	  the	  more	  disadvantaged	  social	  strata	  (in	  terms	  of	  income,	  education	  or	  more	  general	  socio-­‐economic	   resources),	   assuming	   that	   economically	   and	   cognitively	   more	  privileged	  citizens	  tend	  to	  participate	  strongly	  in	  any	  case.	  The	  positive	  link	  be-­‐tween	   social	   status	   and	  participation	  has	   been	   asserted	  mostly	   on	   the	   basis	   of	  cognitive	   arguments,	   i.e.	  with	   regard	   to	   education.	  The	  positive	   correlation	  be-­‐tween	  education	  and	  participation	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  one	  of	  most	  solid	  evidence	  provided	   by	   the	   literature	   on	   political	   participation	   (Kam	   and	   Palmer	   2008;	  Gallego	  2010).	  	  Hence,	  we	  are	  left	  with	  a	  striking	  puzzle:	  during	  the	  recent	  economic	  crisis,	  elec-­‐toral	   turnout	   has	   declined	   among	   the	   highly	   educated	   classes	   in	  most	   countries	  
that	  have	  been	  severely	  hit	  by	  economic	  downturns	  (see	  also	  Gubler	  2013	  for	  simi-­‐lar	   findings).	  The	  assumption	   that	  high	   levels	  of	   resources	   induce	  participation	  may	  no	  longer	  hold.	  Rather,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  hidden	  side	  to	  declining	  turnout	  that	  has	   so	   far	  been	   strongly	  neglected	   in	   theory	  and	  empirical	   research:	  what	  are	   the	   effects	   of	   the	   economic	   crisis	   on	   the	   better-­‐off?	  Our	   argument	   engages	  with	  that	  question	  with	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  changing	  incentive	  structure	  they	  are	  ex-­‐posed	  to.	  	  
	  
3.	   The	   argument:	   electoral	   calculus	   under	   conditions	   of	   constrained	   gov-­‐
ernment	  The	   theorization	  of	   electoral	   calculus	   and	   incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior	   is	  probably	  most	  fully	  developed	  in	  the	  theory	  of	  economic	  voting,	  which	  holds	  that	  voters	  punish	  or	  reward	  the	  government	  in	  line	  with	  the	  course	  of	  the	  economy	  (Key	  1966,	  Duch	  and	  Stevenson	  2008,	  Fossati	  2012).	  The	  empirical	  evidence	  for	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the	  economic	  vote	  overall	  is	  somewhat	  inconclusive	  and	  effects	  are	  substantively	  small	  generally	   (Kayser	  and	  Peress	  2013,	  Kayser	  and	  Wlezien	  2010,	  Fraile	  and	  Lewis-­‐Beck	  2013).	  However,	  the	  great	  merit	  in	  this	  literature	  is	  the	  theorization	  that	   incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior	  is	  highly	  conditional:	   it	  matters	  more	  in	  certain	   (institutional)	   contexts	   than	   others	   and	   for	   certain	   individuals2.	   More	  particularly	  relevant	  to	  our	  research	  question	  is	  the	  finding	  of	  Gomez	  and	  Wilson	  (2006),	  who	   showed	   that	   education	   is	   positively	   related	   to	   the	   likelihood	   that	  citizens	  evaluate	  their	  governments	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  economic	  situation.	  This	  indicates	   that	  highly	  sophisticated	  voters	  are	  more	  sensitive	   to	   incentive-­‐based	  electoral	  behavior.	  Additionally,	  one	  of	  the	  main	  findings	  of	  this	  literature	  holds	  that	   economic	   voting	   is	   a	   forceful	   explanatory	   framework	   only	   in	   contexts	   of	  clearly	  attributable	  government	  responsibility	  (Powell	  and	  Whitten	  1993;	  Duch	  and	  Stevenson	  2008;	  Hobolt,	  Tilley	  and	  Banducci	  2012).	  If	  (highly	  sophisticated)	  voters	  understand	  that	  the	  responsibility	   for	  the	  course	  of	   the	  economy	  cannot	  be	   attributed	   clearly	   to	   a	   government	   party,	   economic	   performance	   does	   not	  predict	  vote	  choice.	  Hence,	  we	  build	  on	  this	  literature	  to	  theorize	  the	  behavior	  of	  sophisticated,	  rational	  voters	   in	  a	  context	  where	  accountability	   is	  severely	  con-­‐strained.	  	  The	   contributions	   by	  Hellwig	   (Hellwig	   and	   Samuels	   2007,	  Hellwig	   2008)	  most	  explicitly	   take	   such	   context	   effects	   into	   account.	   Hellwig	   shows	   that	   economic	  voting	  is	  less	  prevalent	  in	  economically	  interdependent	  (“globalized”)	  countries,	  because	   citizens	   realize	   that	   the	   globalization-­‐induced	   government	   constraints	  make	  it	  much	  harder	  to	  hold	  governments	  accountable	  for	  economic	  outcomes.	  However,	   even	   Hellwig	   theorizes	   only	   vote	   choice,	   not	   vote	   participation.	   The	  question	  why	  “an	  economic	  voter”	  would	  participate	  at	  all	   in	  an	  election	  under	  such	   circumstances	   remains	   unanswered.	   Participation	   is	   a	   question	   that	   the	  economic	  voting	  literature	  has	  hardly	  ever	  addressed,	  however3.	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 More precisely, it has been shown that economic voting is more prevalent in contexts with higher 
levels of turnout (Bengtsson 2004) and with lower levels of aggregate party identification (Kayser and 
Wlezien 2010). 
3 Indeed, most applications of economic voting theories do not address vote abstention at all, a fact that 
has already drawn a lot of criticism (Tillman 2008, Bengtsson 2004, Bohl and Kriesi 2013). 
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This	  is	  where	  we	  place	  our	  argument:	  we	  argue	  that	  constrained	  government	  af-­‐fects	   individuals'	   expectations	   about	   the	   costs	   and	   benefits	   of	   voting,	   and	   we	  therefore	  argue	  that	  government	  constraints	  are	  consequential	  for	  citizens'	  will-­‐ingness	  to	  engage	  in	  electoral	  participation,	  at	  all.	  	  	  Indeed,	  governments	  in	  countries	  hard	  hit	  by	  the	  recent	  financial	  economic	  crisis	  are	  heavily	  constrained	  in	  their	  economic	  policy	  making	  capacity	  by	  the	  interna-­‐tional	  financial	  markets,	  as	  well	  as	  European	  and	  international	  policy	  measures	  (Pontusson	  and	  Raess	  2012).	  We	  maintain	   that	  constrained	  government	  works	  similar	   to	  macroeconomic	   variables	   in	   economic	   voting	  models:	   voters	   include	  the	   perception	   of	   their	   government's	   political	   and	   economic	   constraints	   into	  their	  consideration	  whether	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls.	  It	  seems	  intuitive	  that	  once	  a	  person	  reaches	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  new	  government	  has	  only	  a	  small	  room	  to	  manoeuvre	  disregarded	  its	  ideological	  and	  coalitional	  composition	  (be-­‐cause	  of	  external	  and	  internal	  political	  and	  economic	  pressures),	  the	  willingness	  to	  bear	  the	  costs	  of	  voting	  (i.e.	  the	  investment	  in	  time	  it	  takes	  to	  acquire	  enough	  information	  for	  a	  decision	  and	  carry	  out	  the	  actual	  voting	  procedure)	  is	  likely	  to	  decrease.	  However	  this	  anticipation	  of	  political	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  government	  re-­‐quires	   a	  high	   level	   of	  political	   sophistication	   and	  knowledge.	  Citizens	  with	   low	  levels	  of	  education	  still	  tend	  to	  turn	  to	  the	  national	  governments	  with	  their	  frus-­‐trations	   about	   the	   effects	   of	   increasingly	   globalized	  markets	   (Häusermann	   and	  Kriesi	  forthcoming).	  Therefore,	  government	  constraints	  are	  expected	  to	  weaken	  the	   otherwise	   positive	   effects	   of	   education	   on	   participation,	   thereby	   lowering	  participation	  rates	  among	  the	  highly	  educated.	  	  	  There	  is	  an	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  declining	  turnout	  among	  the	  more	  highly	  educated	   in	   the	   literature,	   which	   is	  more	   structural	   and	   less	   cyclical	   than	   our	  own	   argument:	   political	   indifference,	   alienation	   or	   even	   disgust.	   Peter	   Mair	  (2006,	   2013)	   has	   forcefully	   described	   the	   “hollowing	   of	   democracy”	   through	  both	  an	  increased	  cartelization	  of	  political	  parties	  and	  a	  declining	  macroeconom-­‐ic	  leeway	  for	  politics.	  Schäfer	  (2012)	  and	  Offe	  (2012)	  argue	  in	  a	  similar	  direction.	  In	  such	  a	  reading,	  declining	  levels	  of	  participation	  among	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  part	  of	  the	  electorate	  would	  not	  be	  an	  expression	  of	  rational	  calculus,	  but	  a	  more	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general,	  structural	  detachment	  from	  national-­‐level	  partisan	  politics.	  We	  take	  this	  argument	  seriously,	  as	  the	  evidence	  on	  declining	  levels	  of	  citizen	  engagement	  are	  well	  known.	  However,	  we	  think	  that	  testing	  our	  argument	  over	  time	  (pre-­‐	  mid-­‐	  and	  post-­‐crisis)	  allows	  us	  to	  distinguish	  the	  cyclical	  from	  the	  structural	  process-­‐es.	  	  	  In	  sum,	  we	  expect	  that	  the	  politico-­‐economic	  turmoil	  of	  the	  last	  years	  has	  altered	  the	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  political	  participation.	  In	  times	  of	  crisis,	  education	  should	  be	  less	  strongly	  related	  to	  participation	  than	  in	  times	  of	  more	  relaxed	  constraints,	   since	  highly	  educated	  citizens	  are	  expected	   to	   include	  con-­‐siderations	  about	  their	  government’s	  room	  to	  maneouvre	  into	  their	  pocketbook	  evaluations.	   In	   other	  words,	  we	   hypothesize	   an	   interaction	   effect:	   government	  constraints	  are	  expected	  to	  weaken	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  education	  on	  electoral	  participation.	  This	  is	  what	  we	  will	  test	  in	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  paper.	  	  
4.	  Data	  and	  methods	  To	   test	   our	   hypotheses,	   we	   use	   data	   from	   four	   European	   Social	   Survey	   (ESS)	  rounds	   (2006,	   2008,	   2010	   and	   2012)	   as	   well	   as	   several	   country-­‐level	   data	  sources	  (for	  an	  overview,	  see	  Table	  A.1	  in	  the	  appendix).	  The	  intersection	  of	  the-­‐se	   data	   sources	   allows	   to	   conduct	   the	   analyses	   for	  120’442	   respondents	   in	   the	  following	  28	  countries:	  Austria,	  Belgium,	  Bulgaria,	  Cyprus,	  Czech	  Republic,	  Ger-­‐many,	   Denmark,	   Estonia,	   Spain,	   Finland,	   France,	   Greece,	   Hungary,	   Iceland,	   Ire-­‐land,	   Italy,	   Latvia,	   Lithuania,	   Netherlands,	   Norway,	   Poland,	   Portugal,	   Romania,	  Sweden,	  Switzerland,	  Slovenia,	  Slovak	  Republic,	  United	  Kingdom.4 Our	  main	  independent	  variable	  at	  the	  individual	  level,	  education,	  is	  based	  on	  the	  International	  Standard	  Classification	  of	  Education	  (ISCED).	  We	  recoded	  the	  more	  fine-­‐grained	  classification	  provided	  from	  2010	  onwards	  so	  that	  it	  fits	  the	  5-­‐point	  scale	  used	  in	  the	  ESS	  waves	  up	  to	  the	  year	  2008.	  The	  resulting	  measure	  of	  high-­‐est	  level	  of	  education	  ranges	  from	  “less	  than	  lower	  secondary	  school”	  to	  “tertiary	  degree”.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Note that oftentimes not all ESS waves are available for a country. 
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In	  order	  to	  better	  isolate	  the	  impact	  of	  our	  main	  independent	  variables,	  we	  con-­‐trol	  for	  additional	  factors	  at	  the	  individual	  level	  that	  are	  likely	  to	  affect	  participa-­‐tion.	   To	   account	   for	   incentive-­‐based	   electoral	   behavior	   in	   times	   of	   economic	  hardship,	   we	   include	   unemployment.	   Two	   demographic	   characteristics	   (age,	  gender)	  as	  well	  as	  income	  and	  interest	  in	  politics	  are	  included	  in	  the	  models	  (see	  Solt	  2008).	  In	  the	  ESS,	  income	  is	  reported	  in	  deciles	  and	  the	  variable	  measuring	  political	  interest	  is	  based	  on	  a	  four-­‐item	  scale.	  These	  items	  have	  been	  recoded	  so	  that	  higher	  values	  indicate	  more	  interest	  in	  politics.	  We	  also	  made	  three	  specific	  changes	  on	  single	  variables	  in	  the	  ESS	  data.	  In	  Por-­‐tugal,	  the	  level	  of	  income	  unfortunately	  was	  asked	  in	  a	  slightly	  different	  way	  than	  in	  the	  other	  countries,	  which	  results	   in	  a	  12-­‐item	  scale	   instead	  of	   the	  usual	  10-­‐item	  scale.	  We	  therefore	  had	  to	  rescale	  the	  variable	   for	  Portugal	   in	  order	  to	   in-­‐clude	  it	  into	  the	  models.	  In	  addition,	  we	  include	  the	  quadratic	  function	  of	  age	  into	  the	  analyses	  to	  account	  for	  live-­‐cycle	  effects	  (see	  Blais	  et	  al.	  2004).	  Age	  and	  age2,	  finally,	  were	  rescaled	  by	  dividing	  age	  by	  10	  in	  order	  to	  improve	  the	  convergence	  of	  the	  model	  estimations.	  	  At	   the	   country	   level,	  we	   consider	   three	   specific	   indicators	   of	   government	   con-­‐straint	  (see	  also	  figure	  2	  below).	  First,	  we	  anticipate	  a	  soaring	  public	  deficit	  to	  be	  a	  major	  aspect	  of	  a	  government’s	  room	  to	  maneuver,	  since	  political	  and	  market	  pressures	  for	  austerity	  measures	  are	  likely	  to	  increase	  with	  the	  accumulation	  of	  public	  debt.	  We	  operationalize	  public	  deficit	  with	  the	  World	  Bank	  development	  indicator	  data,	  where	  it	  is	  defined	  as	  cash	  deficit	  in	  percentages	  of	  GDP.5	  Second,	  conditionality	  as	  a	  result	  of	  bailouts	  by	  the	  Troika	  (i.e.	  the	  European	  Commission	  (EC),	   the	   European	   Central	   Bank	   (ECB)	   and	   the	   International	   Monetary	   Fund	  (IMF))	  can	  be	  perceived	  as	  important	  confining	  factor	  for	  the	  governments	  of	  af-­‐fected	   countries.6	  Third,	   not	   only	   political	   constraints	   can	  hamper	   the	   scope	   of	  governmental	  action,	  but	  also	  economic	  constraints.	  Most	  notably,	  we	  regard	  fi-­‐nancial	  market	  pressures	  stemming	  from	  difficulties	  to	  issue	  government	  bonds	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  More	  precisely,	  revenue	  (including	  grants)	  minus	  expense,	  minus	  net	  acquisition	  of	  nonfinancial	  assets.	  
6 The countries are Bulgaria in 2006, Spain in 2012, Greece in 2010, Hungary in 2008 and 2010, Ire-
land in 2010 and 2012, Latvia in 2008, Portugal in 2012. 
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in	   order	   finance	   public	   activities	   as	   a	   challenge	   for	   suffering	   governments,	   not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  actual	  financial	  problems	  but	  also	  because	  of	  the	  accompany-­‐ing	  media	  frenzy	  and	  public	  outcry.	  As	  indicator,	  we	  rely	  on	  the	  long-­‐term	  inter-­‐est	  rates	  for	  government	  bond	  yields	  as	  reported	  by	  the	  OECD	  and	  Eurostat.	  Ob-­‐viously,	  the	  three	  variables	  are	  substantially	  correlated,7	  which	  is	  why	  we	  decid-­‐ed	  to	  run	  separate	  models	  for	  the	  three	  indicators	  and	  a	  factor	  of	  the	  three	  indi-­‐cators.	  The	  factor	  scores	  result	  from	  a	  varimax	  rotated	  maximum-­‐likelihood	  fac-­‐tor	  analysis	  on	  the	  three	  single	  indicators.	  Figure	  3	  illustrates	  the	  development	  of	  these	   government	   constraints	   during	   the	   time	   span	   under	   consideration.	   	   The	  outbreak	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2008	  clearly	  reduced	  governmental	  leeway	  due	  to	   soaring	   levels	   of	   deficits,	   increasing	   bond	   yields	   and	  more	  widespread	   inci-­‐dence	  of	  bailouts	  by	   the	  Troika.	   The	   constraints	   intensified	   in	   the	  aftermath	  of	  Lehman	  Brother’s	  collapse,	  climaxed	  in	  2010	  and	  since	  then	  returned	  to	  a	  path	  of	  recovery.	  	  	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Macro	  level	  indicators	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  
	  Finally,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  control	  for	  political	  covariates	  at	  the	  macro	  level.	  First,	  we	  include	  the	  GDP	  per	  capita	  at	  purchasing	  power	  parity	  into	  the	  calculations	  in	  order	   to	  control	   for	  general	  cross-­‐sectional	  variance	   in	   terms	  of	   the	  severity	  of	  the	  economic	  crisis.	  Furthermore,	  we	  distinguish	  between	  more	  recently	  democ-­‐ratized	  countries	   in	  Eastern	  Europe	  and	  Western	  European	  countries,	  since	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Pearson’s	  R	  of	  -­‐0.38	  (deficit	  and	  bond	  yields),	  -­‐0.27	  (deficit	  and	  conditionality)	  and	  0.66	  (bond	  yields	  and	  conditionality).	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former	  show	  systematically	  lower	  turnout	  levels	  (Pop-­‐Eleches	  and	  Tucker	  2013).	  	  Lastly,	   we	   consider	   party	   system	   polarization	   as	   potentially	   important.	   A	   high	  diversity	  of	  ideological	  party	  positions	  may	  well	  be	  connected	  to	  more	  participa-­‐tion,	  since	  the	  individuals’	  preferences	  are	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  represented	  by	  one	  or	   another	   party	   (Sartori	   1976).	   All	   these	  macro	   indicators	  were	   added	   to	   the	  data	   set	   in	   the	   year	   the	   ESS	   rounds	   were	   fielded	   in	   the	   respective	   countries,	  which	  does	  not	  always	  correspond	  to	  the	  year	  indicated	  for	  the	  waves.	  	  As	  for	  the	  calculations,	  we	  rely	  on	  hierarchical	  regression	  models	  including	  log-­‐likelihood	  ratio	  tests	  comparing	  the	  models	  to	  the	  fit	  of	  the	  empty	  model	  as	  well	  as	  on	  simulations	  of	  the	  predicted	  probabilities	  and	  marginal	  effects.	  In	  addition,	  we	  ran	  a	  multitude	  of	  robustness	  checks	  on	  the	  fully	  specified	  model,	  which	  are	  reported	   in	   Table	   A.2	   in	   the	   appendix.	   The	   checks	   include	   an	   outlier	   analysis	  (Greece	  with	   respect	   to	   government	   bond	   yields,	   Ireland	  with	   regards	   deficit),	  the	  exclusion	  of	  survey	  and	  sample	  weights,	  the	  exclusion	  of	  the	  indicator	  for	  in-­‐come	   in	   light	   of	   the	   considerable	   collinearity	   with	   education,	   the	   inclusion	   of	  more	   fine-­‐grained	  measures	   of	   social	   risk	   (part	   time	  work	   and	   temporary	   em-­‐ployment),	  the	  replacement	  of	  party	  system	  polarization	  with	  the	  effective	  num-­‐ber	  of	  parties	  as	  well	   as	   the	  consideration	  of	   country	  and	  year	   fixed	  effects	   in-­‐stead	  of	  the	  multilevel	  specification.	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  income,	  none	  of	  these	  specifications	   led	  to	  substantial	  changes	   in	  the	  results.	  As	   for	   income,	  there	  are	  two	  possible	  reasons	  for	  the	  non-­‐effect	  with	  regards	  the	  interaction	  between	  ed-­‐ucation	  and	  government	  constraint.	  First,	  the	  inclusion	  of	  income	  might	  be	  nec-­‐essary	  for	  substantial	  reasons	  since	  we	  deal	  with	  financial	  indicators	  at	  the	  mac-­‐ro	  level.	  Second,	  as	  usual	  in	  survey	  analyses,	  the	  indicator	  for	  income	  contains	  a	  lot	  of	  missing	  data.	  Thus,	  we	  might	  have	  a	  systematic	  selection	  bias	  in	  the	  data.8	  	  	  
5.	  How	  constrained	  government	  affects	  the	  relationship	  between	  education	  
and	  participation	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The way to test for selection bias is to run the models on a data set with imputed missing data – some-
thing which certainly will be done in the near future. 
	   14	  
Our	  empirical	  analysis	  is	  organized	  as	  follows.	  In	  a	  first	  step,	  we	  assess	  the	  general	  validity	  of	   our	  hypothesis	   regarding	   the	  political	  participation	  of	  high-­‐skilled	   indi-­‐viduals	   in	   a	   large	   baseline	   model	   in	   which	   individuals	   are	   pooled	   over	   time	   and	  space.	  In	  a	  second	  step,	  we	  address	  the	  debate	  about	  whether	  a	  decline	  in	  participa-­‐tion	  reflects	  a	  general	  and	  structural	  long-­‐term	  trend	  or	  whether	  it	  is	  indeed	  a	  direct	  consequence	  of	   the	  current	  economic	  hardship	  –	  and	  thus	  related	  to	   the	  proposed	  mechanism	   of	   constrained	   governments.	   For	   this	   purpose	   we	   calculate	   separate	  models	  for	  each	  year	  that	  allow	  us	  to	  identify	  potential	  time-­‐varying	  dynamics	  in	  the	  propensity	  to	  vote	  depending	  among	  high	  skilled.	  	  The	   estimated	   coefficients,	   standard	   errors	   and	   significance	   levels	   of	   our	   pooled	  baseline	  model	   are	   shown	   in	  Table	  1.	  To	   support	   the	   substantial	   interpretation	  of	  these	  hierarchical	  logit	  regressions,	  we	  plot	  the	  simulated	  predicted	  probabilities	  for	  different	   levels	   of	   education	   in	   dependence	   on	   the	   indicators	   of	   government	   con-­‐straint	   in	  Figure	  3	   as	  well	   as	   the	  marginal	   effects	   of	   education	   in	   interaction	  with	  government	  constraint	  in	  Figure	  4.9	  	  	  	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 We show the predicted probabilities and marginal effects with the control	   variables	   fixed	   at	   zero	  (dichotomous	  variables)	  as	  well	  as	  their	  mean	  (continuous	  variables).	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Table	  1:	  Hierarchical	  logit	  regression	  models	  predicting	  electoral	  participation	  
 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
      (Intercept) -2.966*** -2.953*** -2.891*** -2.927*** -3.786*** -3.181*** 
 
(0.175) (0.373) (0.282) (0.289 (0.314) (0.264) 
Education 0.194*** 0.160*** 0.154*** 0.214*** 0.196*** 0.164*** 
 
(0.037) (0.008) (0.007) (0.013 (0.008) (0.007) 
Unemployment -0.428*** -0.406*** -0.353*** -0.353*** -0.356*** -0.357*** 
 
(0.035) (0.035) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) 
Age 0.774*** 0.801*** 0.778*** 0.778*** 0.772*** 0.780*** 
 
(0.029) (0.028) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) 
Age2 -0.048*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.051*** -0.050*** -0.051*** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Gender 
(women)a 
0.127*** 0.110*** 0.137*** 0.137*** 0.138*** 0.136*** 
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Hardly interested in 
politicsb 
0.725*** 0.723*** 0.775*** 0.775*** 0.778*** 0.777*** 
(0.024) (0.024) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) 
Quite interested in 
politicsb 
1.386*** 1.409*** 1.451*** 1.451*** 1.453*** 1.455*** 
(0.027) (0.027) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) 
Very interested in 
politicsb 
1.715*** 1.744*** 1.784*** 1.784*** 1.787*** 1.790*** 
(0.040) (0.040) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Income 0.075*** 0.076*** 0.072*** 0.072*** 0.074*** 0.071*** 
 
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Recent  democratiza- 
tion (Eastern Europe)c 
-0.659** -0.597** -0.597** -0.348 -0.574** 
(0.238) (0.225) (0.224) (0.242) (0.217) 
GDP per capita 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Party system 
polarization 
0.617. 0.356 0.353 0.481* 0.963*** 




   (0.035) (0.020) 
   Government con- 
straintXEducation 
-0.031*** 
   (0.005) 
   Deficit 
    
0.059*** 
 
     
(0.006) 
 DeficitXEducation 
   
-0.013*** 
 
     
(0.001) 
 Conditionality 
    
0.024 
      
(0.060) 
ConditionalityX 
Education     
-0.081*** 
    
(0.018) 
Bond yield 
   
0.008 
  
    
(0.009) 
  Bond yieldX 





  N individuals 120442 120442 120442 120442 120442 120442 
N countries 28 28 28 28 28 28 














(df=17) Notes:	   Unstandardized	   logit	   coefficients;	   standard	   errors	   in	   brackets.	   One-­‐tailed	   significance	  tests,	  levels:	  ***	  p	  ≤	  0.001,	  **	  p	  ≤	  0.01,	  *	  p	  ≤	  0.05.	  Reference	  categories:	  a=Male;	  b=Not	  at	  all	  inter-­‐ested	  in	  politics;	  c=Western	  Europe.	  d=Likelihood	  ratio	  compared	  to	  empty	  model.	  	  Model	  1	  shows	  a	  baseline	  specification	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  the	  validity	  of	  our	  mi-­‐cro-­‐level	  operationalization.	   It	   consists	  of	  all	   individual	   level	  predictors,	   the	  multi-­‐level	   specification	  and	  a	   random	  slope	   for	  education.	  Over	  all	   countries,	  education	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unsurprisingly	   picks	   up	   a	   large	   part	   of	   the	   variation	   in	   electoral	   participation	   in	  model	  1.	  The	  increase	  of	  one	  unit	  in	  education	  changes	  the	  odds	  in	  favor	  of	  partici-­‐pation	  to	  1.21.	  	  	  The	  effects	   related	   to	   the	  control	  variables	  unemployment,	  age,	   interest	   in	  politics	  and	   income	  are	  highly	   significant	  and	  work	   in	   the	  direction	  as	  expected	  by	  extant	  studies	   on	   participation	   (e.g.	   Solt	   2008,	   Gallego	   2010).	   In	   contrast,	   the	   significant	  increase	  in	  the	  likelihood	  of	  voting	  for	  women	  compared	  to	  men	  (odds	  ratio	  of	  1.14	  –	  everything	  else	  equal)	  is	  noteworthy	  in	  light	  of	  the	  recent	  literature	  suggesting	  a	  narrowing	  of	  the	  gender	  divide	  in	  terms	  of	  participation	  (see	  Gallego	  2006).	  The	  re-­‐sults	  therefore	  suggest	  that	  the	  crisis	  has	  reversed	  the	  traditionally	  higher	  willing-­‐ness	  of	  men	  to	  vote,	  but,	  as	  for	  economic	  risk,	  a	  more	  extensive	  inspection	  of	  this	  re-­‐lationship	  is	  beyond	  the	  scope	  of	  this	  study.	  	  
	   	  
Figure 3: Predicted probabilities of electoral participation for different levels of educa-
tion, depending on government constraint indicators 
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Figure 4: Estimated marginal effects of education if interacted with government con-
straint indicators 
 The	  contribution	  of	   these	   individual	   level	  predictors	   in	   the	  models	  2	   to	  6	   is	  highly	  consistent	  with	  the	  ones	  in	  model	  1,	  which	  points	  to	  the	  robustness	  of	  our	  individual	  level	  specification.	  As	  for	  country	  level	  covariates,	  we	  introduce	  GDP	  per	  capita,	  the	  predictor	  controlling	   for	  countries	  with	  rather	  recent	  democratization	  (i.e.	  Eastern	  European	  states)	  and	  our	  main	  explanatory	  variable	  –	  the	  factor	  variable	  measuring	  different	   dimensions	   of	   government	   constraint	   (public	   deficit,	   government	   bond	  yields,	  and	  conditionality)	  –	  in	  model	  2.	  The	  only	  country	  level	  variable,	  which	  –	  on	  the	  aggregate	  –	  is	  substantially	  related	  to	  turnout,	  is	  the	  dichotomous	  distinction	  be-­‐tween	  Eastern	  and	  Western	  European	  countries.	  Eastern	  Europeans	  have	  a	  system-­‐atically	   lower	  propensity	   to	   go	   to	   the	  ballots,	  which	   in	   the	   literature	   is	  mainly	   ex-­‐plained	  by	  frustration	  about	  corruption	  and	  the	  ramifications	  of	  communist	  legacies	  (see	   Pop-­‐Eleches	   and	   Tucker	   2013).	   As	   such,	   government	   constraint	   and	   GDP	  growth	  do	  not	  add	  explanatory	  power	  to	  the	  prediction.	  This	  is	  consistent	  with	  our	  initially	   discussed	   evidence	   on	   the	   seemingly	   inexistent	   relationship	   between	   the	  economic	  crisis	  and	  turnout	  levels.	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In	  model	   3	   to	   6,	  we	   test	   the	   interaction	   effects	   of	   different	   operationalizations	   of	  government	   constraint	   and	   education	   in	   a	   stepwise	   fashion.	   The	  main	   finding	  we	  want	   to	   emphasize	   here	   is	   that	   government	   constraint	   substantially	  moderates	   the	  
effect	  education	  has	  on	  participation.	  The	  graphs	  in	  Figure	  2	  show	  that	   in	  countries	  where	  public	  deficit,	  government	  bond	  yields	  and	  conditionality	  work	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  governments	  room	  to	  maneuver,	  education	  is	  related	  to	  an	  increase	  in	  the	  predicted	  probability	   of	   around	   10	   percentage	   points	   (or	   even	   20	   percentage	   points	   in	   the	  case	  of	  deficit).	  In	  countries	  with	  an	  average	  strength	  of	  government	  constraint,	  the	  positive	  effect	  of	  education	  is	  slightly	  moderated.	  The	  crucial	  difference	  occurs	  with	  regard	   to	   the	   countries	   with	   a	   strongly	   constrained	   government,	   namely	   Greece,	  Portugal,	  Hungary	  and	  Ireland	  in	  our	  sample.	  Here,	  education	  ceases	  to	  have	  an	  ef-­‐fect	  on	  participation.	  This	  is	  confirmed	  by	  the	  visualization	  of	  the	  marginal	  effects	  in	  Figure	  3.	  At	  a	  level	  of	  about	  3	  of	  our	  factor	  for	  constrained	  government	  	  –	  which	  sep-­‐arates	  the	  heavily	  constrained	  countries	  from	  the	  other	  countries	  –,	  the	  positive	  re-­‐lationship	  of	  education	  on	  participation	  becomes	  insignificant.	  According	  to	  our	  ar-­‐gumentation,	  this	  outcome	  is	  the	  effect	  of	  pessimistic	  expectations	  by	  the	  better	  ed-­‐ucated	  on	  the	  leverage	  their	  vote	  has	  with	  regards	  to	  government	  effectiveness.	  	  We	  believe	   that	  government	  constraint	  during	   the	  economic	  and	   financial	  crisis	  of	  the	  last	  years	  is	  a	  complex	  occurrence	  shaped	  by	  several	  aspects	  of	  the	  domestic	  and	  international	  politico-­‐economic	  context.	  Nevertheless,	  the	  graphs	  in	  Figure	  2	  and	  3	  show	   that	   the	   single	   indicators	   of	   our	   government	   constraint	   indicator	   have	   the	  same	  moderating	  effect	  on	  the	  education-­‐participation	  nexus.	  The	  higher	  the	  levels	  of	   constraints,	   i.e.	   the	  more	   restricted	   the	  maneuvering	   room	  of	   governments,	   the	  smaller	   the	   generally	   positive	   effect	   of	   education	   on	   electoral	   participation.	  At	   se-­‐vere	   levels	  of	   constraints,	   the	  high	  skilled	  even	   fully	  cease	  being	  more	   likely	   to	  go	  the	  ballots.	  For	  example,	  at	  a	  public	  deficit	  of	  about	  –10%	  or	  below	  education	  entire-­‐ly	  loses	  the	  explanatory	  power	  it	  usually	  has.	  Likewise,	  conditionality	  in	  the	  context	  of	  international	  financial	  agreements	  substantially	  lowers	  the	  propensity	  of	  individ-­‐uals	  with	  upper	  secondary	  level	  education	  or	  higher.).	  It	  has	  to	  be	  emphasized	  that,	  although	  we	  have	  only	  a	   few	  countries	   in	  the	  sample	  with	  severe	   levels	  of	  govern-­‐ment	  constraint,	  the	  effects	  are	  not	  systematically	  driven	  by	  single	  cases.	  The	  exclu-­‐sion	  of	  outliers	  –	  Ireland	  in	  the	  model	  estimating	  the	  effect	  of	  public	  deficit	  as	  well	  as	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Greece	  in	  the	  model	  including	  government	  bond	  yields	  –	  does	  neither	  affect	  the	  sig-­‐nificance	  nor	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  effect	  of	  government	  constraint	  on	  the	  relationship	  between	  education	  and	  participation.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  this	  empirical	  analysis	  thus	  provides	  strong	  evidence	  of	  decreasing	  participation	   levels	  among	  high	  skilled	   in	  certain	  countries.	  However,	   the	  question	  whether	   our	   findings	   indeed	   reflect	   deliberate	   individual	   reactions	   to	   economic	  strain	  or	  rather	  display	  ramifications	  of	  a	  general	  long-­‐term	  trend	  remains	  an	  open	  one	   so	   far.	   If	   the	   declining	  willingness	   to	   vote	   in	   elections	   is	   in	   fact	   based	   on	   the	  mechanism	   proposed	   here,	   then	   we	   should	   see	   varying	   patterns	   of	   participation	  among	   high-­‐skilled	   over	   time.	   The	   very	   extent	   of	   government	   constraints	   differs	  considerably	   across	   time	   (see	   Figure	   2)	   and	   so	   should	   thus	   the	   reaction	   of	   well-­‐informed	   voters.	  We	   therefore	   computed	   hierarchical	   regression	  models	   for	   each	  year	  in	  our	  data	  set	  separately.	  The	  time	  span	  from	  2006	  until	  2012	  allows	  us	  to	  re-­‐examine	  the	  proposed	  interaction	  effects	  for	  pre-­‐	  as	  well	  as	  post-­‐crisis	  years,	  which	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  constraints.	  Table	  2	  displays	  year-­‐specific	  coefficients,	  standard	  errors	  and	  significance	  levels	  of	  the	  model	  speci-­‐fied	  in	  the	  above.10	  	   In	   line	  with	  our	  theoretical	  expectation	  as	  well	  as	  with	  the	  de-­‐velopment	   of	   government	   constraints	   over	   time	   (Figure	   2),	   the	   proposed	  mecha-­‐nism	   is	   only	   significant	   in	   the	   year	   2010	   –	   arguably	   the	   year	  when	   deficits,	   bond	  yields	  and	  the	  activism	  of	  the	  Troika	  peaked.	  In	  contrast,	  we	  do	  neither	  find	  signifi-­‐cantly	  moderated	  participation	   levels	   for	   the	  high	  skilled	   in	  pre-­‐crisis	  years	  nor	   in	  the	  recent	  past	  when	  European	  economies	  started	  a	  slow	  recovery.	  	  
	  
	   	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 We only show results of one measure for government constraints, the factor resulting from the other 
three indicators, noting that the application of alternative indicators yields very similar effects.  
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Table	  1:	  Hierarchical	  logit	  regression	  models	  predicting	  electoral	  participation	  by	  
year	  	   2006	   2008	   2010	   2012	  (Intercept)	   -­‐3.134***	   -­‐2.807***	   -­‐2.105*	   -­‐2.883***	  	   (0.857)	   (0.725)	   (0.822)	   (0.663)	  Education	   0.132***	   0.184***	   0.133***	   0.186***	  	   (0.020)	   (0.015)	   (0.015)	   (0.017)	  Unemployment	   -­‐0.336***	   -­‐0.382***	   -­‐0.558***	   -­‐0.339***	  	   (0.074)	   (0.071)	   (0.062)	   (0.055)	  Age	   0.865***	   0.917***	   0.654***	   0.760***	  	   (0.057)	   (0.052)	   (0.053)	   (0.049)	  Age2	   -­‐0.056***	   -­‐0.064***	   -­‐0.036***	   -­‐0.047***	  	   (0.006)	   (0.005)	   (0.005)	   (0.005)	  Gender	  (women)a	   0.156***	   0.104**	   0.160***	   0.031	  	   (0.036)	   (0.034)	   (0.034)	   (0.032)	  Hardly	  interested	  in	  politicsb	   0.700***	   0.764***	   0.786***	   0.665***	  	   (0.047)	   (0.046)	   (0.043)	   (0.041)	  Quite	  interested	  in	  politicsb	   1.412***	   1.354***	   1.507***	   1.400***	  	   (0.053)	   (0.049)	   (0.049)	   (0.046)	  Very	  interested	  in	  politicsb	   1.737***	   1.858***	   1.734***	   1.697***	  	   (0.081)	   (0.078)	   (0.072)	   (0.070)	  Income	   0.111***	   0.055***	   0.062***	   0.082***	  	   (0.010)	   (0.007)	   (0.007)	   (0.006)	  Recent	  democratization	  	  (Eastern	  Europe)c	   -­‐0.871*	   -­‐1.198**	   -­‐0.743*	   -­‐0.659*	  (0.437)	   (0.399)	   (0.350)	   (0.285)	  GDP	  per	  capita	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	   0.000	  	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	   (0.000)	  Party	  system	  polarization	   2.855.	   2.234	   0.578	   0.773	  	   (1.715)	   (1.603)	   (1.461)	   (1.326)	  Government	  constraint	   0.882	   0.113	   0.196*	   0.111	  	   (0.650)	   (0.197)	   (0.098)	   (0.111)	  Government	  constraintX	  Education	   0.065	   -­‐0.027	   -­‐0.034**	   -­‐0.015	  (0.069)	   (0.025)	   (0.013)	   (0.016)	  N	  individuals	   25697	   29925	   31990	   32830	  N	  countries	   19	   21	   23	   24	  LR-­‐Testd	  	   1164.4***	  (df=16)	   1202.9***	  (df=16)	   1324.7***	  (df=16)	   1432.2***	  (df=16)	  Notes:	   Unstandardized	   logit	   coefficients;	   standard	   errors	   in	   brackets.	   One-­‐tailed	   significance	  tests,	  levels:	  ***	  p	  ≤	  0.001,	  **	  p	  ≤	  0.01,	  *	  p	  ≤	  0.05.	  Reference	  categories:	  a=Male;	  b=Not	  at	  all	  inter-­‐ested	  in	  politics;	  c=Western	  Europe.	  d=Likelihood	  ratio	  compared	  to	  empty	  model.	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Figure	  5:	  Predicted	  probabilities	  of	  electoral	  participation	  for	  different	  levels	  of	  ed-­‐
ucation	  over	  time,	  depending	  on	  government	  constraints	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Figure	  6:	  Estimated	  marginal	  effects	  of	  education	  if	  interacted	  with	  government	  
constraints	  over	  time	  	  Figures	  5	  and	  6	  lend	  confidence	  to	  these	  findings	  and	  allow	  for	  a	  more	  detailed	  eval-­‐uation	  of	  the	  underlying	  dynamic	  aspect	  of	  our	  argumentation.	  	  As	  expected,	  in	  pre-­‐crisis	  years	  (upper	  left	  graph	  in	  Figure	  5)	  the	  three	  slopes	  are	  virtually	  parallel	  (i.e.	  no	   interaction	  effect)	  and	  reveal	  a	  generally	   increasing	  probability	  to	  vote	  with	   in-­‐creasing	  levels	  of	  education	  –	  just	  as	  standard	  theory	  would	  predict.	  However,	  this	  positive	  slope	  vanishes	  as	  soon	  as	  governments	  face	  higher	  levels	  of	  constraints	  due	  to	  the	  outbreak	  of	  the	  financial	  crisis	  in	  2008.	  The	  high	  skilled	  presumably	  anticipate	  the	  reduced	  maneuvering	  room	  for	  domestic	  politicians	   in	  an	  environment	  of	  eco-­‐nomic	  hardship	  and	  cease	  being	  more	  diligent	  voters	  compared	   to	   the	   low	  skilled.	  This	  effect	  is	  most	  pronounced	  in	  the	  year	  2010	  and	  slightly	  recedes	  in	  the	  most	  re-­‐cent	  wave	  of	  the	  ESS.	  Hence,	  the	  change	  in	  participation	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  developed	  in	  tandem	  with	  the	  constraints.	  Figure	  6	  displays	  marginal	  effects	  of	  edu-­‐

















































































































	   23	  
cation	  on	  voting	  dependent	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  government	  constraints	  and	  gives	  further	  credence	  to	  the	  dynamic	  pattern	  in	  line	  with	  our	  theoretical	  expectations.	  The	  apparent	  time-­‐varying	  effects	  regarding	  the	  high-­‐skilled	  citizen’s	  propensity	  to	  vote	  revealed	   in	   this	  chapter	  are	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  an	  explanation	  based	  on	  a	  general	  decrease	  of	  political	   interest	  among	  this	  segment	  of	  society.	  Political	   indif-­‐ference	  and	  alienation	  are	  relatively	  stable	  attitudes	  and	  unlikely	  to	  change	  within	  a	  few	  years	  only.	  Rather,	  the	  observed	  shifts	   in	  attitudes	  among	  high-­‐skilled	  support	  our	  argumentation	  of	  a	  cyclical	  trend	  closely	  related	  to	  the	  current	  economic	  situa-­‐tion.	   These	   findings	   thus	   support	   our	   argumentation	   of	   highly	   educated	   and	  well-­‐informed	  citizens	  who	  anticipate	  their	  government’s	  inefficacy	  in	  the	  face	  of	  signifi-­‐cantly	  reduced	  political	  autonomy.	  The	  choice	  to	  deliberately	  refrain	  from	  voting	  in	  times	   of	   economic	   strain	   appears	   as	   a	   plausible	   option	   for	   all	   those	   who	   are	  equipped	   with	   the	   cognitive	   resources	   to	   understand	   the	   immediate	   implications	  and	  consequences	  of	  constraint	  governments.	  	  	  
7.	  Conclusion	  While	  an	   increasing	   literature	  studies	   the	  policy	  reactions	   in	   the	  political	  after-­‐math	  of	  the	  great	  recession,	  studies	  on	  the	  effect	  of	  the	  crisis	  on	  the	  political	  be-­‐haviour	  of	   individuals	   is	  still	  very	  rare.	   In	  engaging	  in	  this	  research	  question,	   it	  seems	  crucial	   to	  distinguish	  different	  social	  groups,	  who	  are	  affected	  very	  une-­‐qually	  by	   the	  crisis	  and	  whose	  reaction	  to	  different	  sets	  of	  grievances	  and	  con-­‐straints	  are	  likely	  to	  differ.	  This	  is	  why	  in	  this	  paper,	  we	  have	  distinguished	  theo-­‐retical	  mechanisms	  and	  empirical	  effects	   for	   the	  group	  of	  highly	  educated	   indi-­‐viduals,	  whose	  level	  of	  turnout	  in	  national	  elections	  has	  dropped	  in	  many	  crisis-­‐affected	  countries.	  None	  of	  the	  existing	  theories	  of	  political	  participation	  can	  ac-­‐count	  for	  such	  a	  drop,	  since	  they	  all	  assume	  economically	  and	  cognitively	  more	  privileged	  citizens	  to	  participate	  strongly	  in	  any	  context.	  In	  contrast	  to	  these	  ex-­‐pectations,	   we	   showed	   that	   with	   increasing	   political	   and	   economic	   austerity	  pressures	  weighting	  on	  their	  government,	  better	  educated	  voters	  tend	  to	  abstain	  from	  the	  polls	  just	  as	  much	  or	  even	  more	  so	  than	  less	  educated	  persons.	  Where	  public	  deficit,	  government	  bond	  yields	  and	  conditionality	  work	  in	  favor	  of	  a	  gov-­‐ernment’s	  room	  to	  manoeuvre,	  higher	  levels	  of	  education	  are	  related	  to	  a	  higher	  propensity	  to	  vote	  –	  just	  as	  the	  usual	  expectations	  in	  the	  participation	  literature	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would	  anticipate.	  By	  contrast,	  when	  government	  is	  severely	  constrained,	  the	  ef-­‐fect	  of	  education	  on	  participation	  weakens	  strongly	  and	  becomes	  even	  in	  signifi-­‐cant	  under	  the	  circumstances	  of	  high	  bond	  yields	  and	  high	  public	  deficits.	  	  	  We	  explained	  this	  finding	  with	  a	  rationalist	  argument:	  once	  a	  person	  reaches	  the	  conclusion	  that	  the	  new	  government	  has	  only	  a	  small	  room	  to	  manoeuver	  disre-­‐garded	   its	   ideological	   and	   coalitional	   composition,	   the	   willingness	   to	   bear	   the	  costs	  of	  voting	  is	  likely	  to	  decrease.	  Yet,	  this	  anticipation	  of	  political	  inefficacy	  of	  the	  government	  requires	  a	  high	   level	  of	  political	  sophistication	  and	  knowledge.	  The	   full	   political	   repercussions	   caused	   by	   soaring	   public	   deficits,	   high	   govern-­‐ment	  bond	  yield	  rates	  or	  the	  conditionality	  induced	  by	  financial	  agreements	  can	  be	  quite	  complex	  and	  difficult	  to	  foresee.	  This	  is	  why	  we	  formulate	  this	  theoreti-­‐cal	  model	  only	  with	   regard	   to	   the	  highly	  educated	   citizens.	   In	  other	  words,	  we	  showed	   that	   constraint	   government	  works	   similar	   to	  macroeconomic	  variables	  in	   economic	   voting	   models:	   highly	   sophisticated	   voters	   include	   their	   govern-­‐ment's	  political	  and	  economic	  constraints	  into	  their	  calculus	  whether	  it	  is	  worth	  to	  go	  to	  the	  polls.	  	  	  The	  alternative	  explanation	  for	  declining	  turnout	  among	  the	  more	  highly	  educat-­‐ed	  refers	  to	  indifference,	  alienation	  or	  even	  disgust	  with	  partisan	  politics	  in	  con-­‐temporary	  democracies.	  In	  this	  line	  of	  argumentation,	  declining	  levels	  of	  partici-­‐pation	  among	  the	  more	  sophisticated	  part	  of	  the	  electorate	  would	  not	  be	  an	  ex-­‐pression	  of	  rational	  calculus,	  but	  a	  more	  general,	  structural	  detachment	  from	  na-­‐tional-­‐level	  partisan	  politics.	  We	  have	  addressed	  this	  concern	  by	  testing	  our	  ar-­‐gument	  over	  time	  (pre-­‐	  mid-­‐	  and	  post-­‐crisis),	  in	  order	  to	  distinguish	  the	  cyclical	  from	  the	  structural	  processes.	  Our	  results	  show	  that	  the	  effects	  of	  education	  on	  participation	   co-­‐evolve	   with	   the	   development	   of	   constraints:	   before	   the	   crisis,	  government	  constraints	  did	  not	  depress	  the	  effect	  of	  education	  on	  participation	  significantly,	  and	  the	  effect	  weakened	  again	  when	  the	  constraints	  relaxed.	  Hence,	  the	  change	  in	  participation	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  developed	  in	  line	  with	  the	  constraints.	  We	  take	  this	  as	  evidence	  for	  the	  fact	  that	  structural	  disengagement	  with	  partisan	  politics	  does	  not	  account	  for	  the	  full	  picture	  of	  declining	  participa-­‐tion	  among	  the	  highly	  educated	  citizens.	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In	  sum,	  our	  findings	  show	  that	  the	  effect	  of	  government	  constraints,	  besides	  oth-­‐er	   non-­‐electoral	   consequences,	   leads	   to	   shifts	   in	   the	   composition	   of	   the	   elec-­‐torate.	  This,	  of	  course,	  has	  important	  normative	  ramifications	  on	  the	  democratic	  quality	  of	  elections.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  a	  moderation	  of	  participatory	  inequalities	  caused	   by	   education	   should	   be	  welcomed,	   since	   this	   improves	   the	   representa-­‐tiveness	   of	   elections.	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   if	   overall	   participation	  decreases,	   this	  posits	  a	  challenge	  to	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  electoral	  contests.	  	  Therefore,	  more	  equal	  participation	  at	  lower	  levels	  in	  the	  end	  does	  not	  seem	  desirable	  from	  a	  theoreti-­‐cal-­‐normative	  perspective.	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Table	  A.1:	  Micro	  level	  indicators	  used	  in	  the	  analysis	  
Variable	   Operationalization	   Mean	   Standard	  	  
Deviation	  
Education First digit of variable edulvlb in ESS 5. “What is 
the highest level of education you have successfully 





Based variable mnactic in ESS “Main activity, last 
7 days”. Recoded so that “unemployed, looking for 
job” and “unemployed, not looking for a job” are 
counted as unemployed. 
 
0.06 0.24 
Gender Based on variable gndr in ESS. “Sex of respond-
ent” Recoded so that (0=men, 1=women) 
 
0.54 0.50 
Age	   Based	  on	  variable	  agea	  in	  ESS.	  “Age	  of	  respond-­‐
ent,	  calculated”	  
	  
48.2	   18.57	  
Interest	   Based on variable polintr in ESS. “How interested 
would you say you are in politics – are you...?” 
Recoded so that (1=”not  at all interested in poli-
tics”, 4=”very interested in politics”) 
 
2.64	   0.91	  
Income	   Based on variable hinctnta in ESS.“Household's 
total net income, all sources (in deciles)”	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Table	  A.2:	  Robustness	  checks	  on	  the	  fully	  specified	  model	  (interaction	  between	  educa-­‐
tion	  and	  government	  constraint	  factor)	  	  	   Estimate	   Std.Error	   Pr(>|z|)	  
No	  weights	   	  	   	   	  	  Education	   0.153	   0.007	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.019	   0.020	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.031	   0.005	   ***	  
Without	  interest	  in	  politics	   	   	   	  	  Education	   0.265	   0.008	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.043	   0.046	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.031	   0.012	   **	  
Without	  income	   	   	   	  	  Education	   0.199	   0.008	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.009	   0.046	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.019	   0.012	   	  	  
Country	  and	  year	  fixed	  effects	   	   	   	  	  Education	   0.154	   0.008	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.023	   0.033	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.027	   0.009	   **	  
Effective	  number	  of	  parties	  instead	  of	  party	  system	  polarization	  Education	   0.154	   0.009	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.012	   0.045	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.028	   0.012	   *	  
Additional	  measures	  of	  social	  risk	  (part	  time	  and	  temporary	  employment)	  Education	   0.162	   0.009	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.077	   0.050	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.034	   0.013	   **	  
Outliers	  excluded	   	   	   	  	  Education	   0.157	   0.009	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.111	   0.046	   *	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.023	   0.012	   .	  
Additional	  social	  risk	  indicators	   	   	   	  	  Education	   0.154	   0.009	   ***	  Government	  constraints	   0.030	   0.047	   	  	  EducationXGovernment	  constraint	   -­‐0.026	   0.012	   *	  
Notes: Only main effects shown. Significance codes: *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05, . = 0.1 
 
